North Korea & Iran: Is Bluster a Policy?

Are we Painting Ourselves Into a Corner on North Korea, Iran, and Non-Proliferation?

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani

I have started to wonder what exactly we hope to gain from the apparent Trump Administration policy towards nuclear threshold nations.

I am trying to figure out what incentives we are creating for them to comply with our increasingly bellicose demands.

At the heart of the nuclear proliferation issue lies several problems and contradictions:

• It is now considered a de facto international crime to try to acquire nuclear weapons but at the same time, the major nuclear weapons states are free to possess, modernize, and increase their massive nuclear arsenals at will (a crime enforced with sanctions etc.). These states are rarely challenged and are usually Security Council members at the UN.
• So-called rogue state leaders see what happened to Gadhafi after he renounced his nuclear weapons program (he was ultimately dragged through the streets after being deposed) and conclude that the only guarantor of non-interference and sovereignty is to possess nuclear weapons.

So, one would have to assume that for many of these leaders, even strict economic sanctions, unless those sanctions create enough suffering to spark a coup or popular uprising against the government, pursuing nuclear weapons has become a RATIONAL policy choice and maybe the only policy choice that can ensure regime survival.

So, in other words, our ability to dissuade people from acquiring nuclear weapons is decreasing at the same time we are facing at two recalcitrant nuclearizing states concurrently.

Despite this, President Trump has absolutely set a red line declaring at the UN that if North Korea doesn’t renounce its nuclear program that the United States will be forced to “Destroy North Korea.”

Am I crazy here or are we reinforcing the message that possession of nuclear weapons is the ONLY guarantor of non-interference?

Problem One: Why Would North Korea Renounce?

Look, Over There, It’s a Dotard

If Kim Jong Un renounces his nuclear program, after having already been declared a ‘Mad Man’ and a person willing to ‘murder’ his own people, what incentive have we given him to believe that he or his regime would be safe?

But, now, at the same time, President Trump is threatening to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear deal despite substantial and certified compliance from Iran.

This raises a large credibility problem, as David E. Sanger noted today in the New York Times (quoting Wendy R. Sherman):

“If the president pulls back on the Iran deal, given Iranian compliance with its terms, said Wendy R. Sherman, the chief negotiator of the accord, will make diplomacy on North Korea almost impossible because U.S. credibility will be shot. Presumably, the United States would have to make some concessions to North Korea in return for limits on its nuclear program. But why negotiate with the United States if this president or the next one can just throw out any agreement?”

President Trump has done nothing but signal contempt towards Kim Jong Un, why would Kim believe that Trump would honor any future agreement or that any future agreement would be honored by his predecessors?

Problem Two: Why Would ANYONE Negotiate In Good Faith With The United States?

All Non-Trump Deals are BAD

Rolling back every deal the United States has ever participated in may keep President Trump’s political base happy, but it begs an important question:

If the United States can throw away all deals whenever they decide those deals are no longer in their interest, why would anyone put faith in any deal the United States brokers?

Why would anyone believe in any deal in general?

Why would anyone believe that any deal could be trusted beyond the length of term of any particular President (essentially, the message President Trump is sending is that our Treaty Obligations carry the same predictable and binding force internationally as Executive Orders do domestically)?

This is uniquely problematic in nuclear non-proliferation negotiations where we are already losing leverage and credibility (see above).

Problem Three? Why Would Iran Continue To Comply? Unless The US Enforces Its Threats on North Korea?

YIKES

Bluster isn’t a policy.

Earlier today I saw a bunch of messages like this cross my Twitter feed:

So, anyone who thinks it was dangerous to threaten:

North Korea

Iran

Iraq

Syria

Afghanistan

Venezuela

Cuba

All at the same time in one UN speech must be in cahoots with Kim Jong Un?

Just another version of the America “Love it or Leave It” message only this time tailored towards support for President Trump.

How are messages like that helpful? Are we really supposed to just shut up and sit quietly with full faith in the Dear Leader (irony intentional).

Are you also suggesting bold solutions are always the best solutions?

It would be bold to go to war with North Korea and timid to opt for diplomatic solutions, right?

And, how could the United States “boldly” manage conflicts with all of those countries at once?

Here is the problem, we have basically placed the credibility of our entire non-proliferation policy on North Korea renouncing their nuclear program.

If North Korea doesn’t stand down, it will reinforce the notion that nuclear weapons are the ONLY guarantor of non-interference which will encourage all other threshold states to redouble their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

Why would Iran or anyone else continue to negotiate with any degree of good faith in a world where we stand down or reinforce the importance of maintaining the path towards nuclear acquisition?

In other words, we will leave ourselves with only three options if we continue along this path:

1. Praying that somehow new sanctions combined with Chinese pressure (and the rest of the international community) convince Kim that it is in his interest to renounce his nuclear program.
2. Standing down and allowing North Korea to nuclearize (combined with copious tweets and media surrogates blaming it all on Obama and Clinton — but not Reagan or either Bush?)
3. Attacking North Korea

I am starting to believe that we have painted ourselves into a corner on North Korea and that we are either going to blink and lose all credibility or we are actually going to go to war on the Korean Peninsula.

Bold speeches sound good, and cheerleading might make you feel better about your silo, but not only would any conflict on the Peninsula risk millions of lives, it is hard to imagine that China (or many of the rest of the involved countries) stand down and just watch while we go to war with North Korea.

Perhaps a few more people should check out why we ceased hostilities in Korea last time (hint — China got involved militarily).

So, why am I wrong? What coherent sense does this policy make to you?

Josh is a blogger and freelance writer who writes about television, movies, music, politics, ethics, and whatever else is of interest coming across his feed.